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Note
Moving from "Broken Windows" to Healthy
Neighborhood Policy: Reforming Urban Nuisance
Law in Public and Private Sectors
Bryan M. Seiler*
Monica is a mother of four who lived in a duplex with her
fianc6, Shawn.1 The African American family resided in a pre-
dominantly white urban neighborhood. Early in their tenancy,
the family discovered by way of threats from neighbors that the
white property owners were meeting to discuss tactics for evict-
ing them. When the family confronted a neighbor who was
spreading rumors that they were dealing drugs, the neighbor
timidly repeated the assertions and the discussion ended with a
request by the family to stop spreading the rumors. A few
hours later, police arrived at the scene, responding to a phone
call by the neighbor that the family had violently threatened
him. The police briefly investigated but did not file a charge.
A few weeks later, the family received a letter from the
city's Problem Properties Unit stating that the city was revok-
ing the property's rental registration. The letter cited the
neighbor's police call as the sole ground for revocation. The let-
ter also informed the family that they could appear at a city
hall administrative hearing to contest the charges. The family
panicked, since they had to find replacement housing quickly or
lose their Section 8 assistance. 2 After weeks of fruitless at-
* J.D. and M.P.P. Candidate, Dec. 2008, University of Minnesota Law
School and Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs; B.A. 2005, Whea-
ton College (Illinois). The author thanks Laura K. Jelinek, Perry DeStefano,
Professors Alexandra B. Klass and David Stras, and the board and staff of the
Minnesota Law Review for their invaluable guidance in the development of
this Note. The author also wishes to thank his family, friends, and especially
Erika, for their constant love and support. Copyright © 2008 by Bryan M. Sei-
ler.
1. This example is based on a case the author worked on as a summer
law clerk with a Minnesota Legal Services program in 2006. Clients' names
have been changed to protect their identities.
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCH.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tempts to locate affordable rentals with space for their family,
Monica called legal aid as a last resort. Since the city's charges
failed to meet both the substantive legal and notice require-
ments of the city's public nuisance ordinance, legal aid attor-
neys pressured the city attorneys to drop the charges. This le-
gal vindication came with few tangible benefits for the family,
however; they were still forced to move because they had trans-
ferred their Section 8 voucher to another property during their
hurried search for replacement housing.
Monica and Shawn's story is hardly unique. Local govern-
ments across the United States are increasingly enacting and
ramping up enforcement of public nuisance laws to tackle not
only "problem properties" like Monica and Shawn's, 3 but also
urban blight more generally, 4 excessive noise,5 annoying pets,6
gangs, 7 drug use,8 sex offenders, 9 and suspicious hangouts. 10 In
his seminal sociolegal essay Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
ER PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK ch. 8, 8-11 to 8-14 (2001), available at http:/www
.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/html/pdfforms/7420g08.pdf (setting forth guidelines
for voucher expiration after issuance). The Section 8 Program provides hous-
ing choice vouchers to very low-income families as well as elderly and disabled
individuals. 24 U.S.C. § 982 (2000).
3. See Bruce Cadwallader, The Challenge of Enforcement, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 2002, at Al; N. Tonawanda May Close Building as a
Nuisance, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 11, 1998, at B4.
4. See Doane Yawger, Inspectors on Lookout for Blight, Eyesores,
MERCED SUN-STAR, Dec. 25, 2004, at 3.
5. See Random Inspirations, Observations, Ruminations, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 3, 2005, at lB.
6. See Chris Hedges, Standing up for Pets and Their Humans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at B2.
7. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of
Public Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 409, 411 (1999) (exploring California's use of public nuisance law as an
anti-gang measure); Jessica Garrison & Zeke Minaya, Judge OKs South L.A.
Apartment Evictions, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at Al (describing a recent de-
cision to evict all tenants from a gang-dominated apartment building).
8. See Kimberly O'Brien, Reclaiming Chapman Avenue, ROANOKE
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at Al (discussing the city's Drug Blight ordinance and
its invocation to pressure landlords to evict tenants for drug use); David
Owens, City Wants to See Bar Closed, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 24, 1999, at
B1.
9. Oakland Closing Down House Sheltering Sex Offender, DAILY REVIEW
(Hayward, Cal.), Mar. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Oakland].
10. See Stewart Ain, Town Takes Different Tack to Shut Down a Hotel,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, at 6; Russ Buettner & Ray Rivera, For Owners of
Club in Police Shooting Case, Years of Raids and Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2006, at 45; Dean Solov & Kenneth Knight, Police: Glut of Arrests Led to Evic-
tions, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 26, 1998, at 8.
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Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, Mark Galanter hy-
pothesizes that the legal experience of the parties, which he
characterizes as "one shotters" and "repeat players," plays a
fundamental role in their success in the legal system general-
ly.11 His conclusion about the systemic bias of the legal system
is every bit as applicable to the public nuisance laws that pit
the resources of powerful state actors against unorganized and
often economically disadvantaged defendants.
This Note proposes statutory reforms at the state and local
level to eliminate the undesirable legal and social consequences
of current uses of public nuisance statutes. In addition, this
Note sets forth an accompanying private attorney general pros-
ecution structure to reintroduce market mechanisms and pre-
vent abuse by overeager neighbors. Part I introduces the com-
mon law origins of nuisance law, the evolution of the doctrine
in cities during the Progressive Era, and the usage of nuisance
law in the modern urban renewal context. Part II argues that
the current use of public nuisance law by cities as a civil in-
junctive remedy is unsound in both its assumptions and me-
thodology; violative of modern takings jurisprudence; contrary
to economic efficiency; ineffective as an urban renewal strategy;
and unable to safeguard the vulnerable populations it claims to
protect.
In light of these deficiencies, Part III begins by suggesting
three short-term changes to public nuisance law: suspending
publicly brought civil actions, 12 temporarily deregulating the
barriers for private parties, and incorporating uniform proce-
dural and legal protections. The next Section outlines a public-
private partnership to decrease the enforcement gap caused by
the short-term solutions by requiring private actors to account
for the economic consequences of the decision to prosecute pub-
lic nuisances. The Note concludes by reiterating the imminent
need for drastic public and private sector reforms to reduce
abuse of public nuisance statutes and allocate public resources
more efficiently and equitably.
11. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT
AHEAD? 14 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003).
12. This term is defined in Part I.C.3.b below to refer to public nuisance
actions brought by public actors in civil courts.
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I. URBAN PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW: PAST AND PRESENT
Any discussion of nuisance law must acknowledge Dean
Prosser's well-known axiom that "[t]here is perhaps no more
impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which sur-
rounds the word 'nuisance."' 13 All jurisdictions in the United
States have criminal statutes that encompass public nuisances
without defining them, or, "at most," provide "a very general
and rather meaningless definition."'14 Law enforcement agen-
cies can impose drastic penalties on landlords with perceived
problem tenants-most jurisdictions allow police to shut down
properties for up to a year or revoke rental certifications inde-
finitely without compensation. 15 Tenants' ability to contest the
claims against them is diminished by the deference appellate
courts give to lower courts and administrative bodies in nuis-
ance enforcement. 16 The result of this lack of clarity is the indi-
scriminate use by cities and private citizens of this powerful
tool for order control and neighborhood redefinition.
A. COMMON LAW ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS
The legal meanings of the word "nuisance" are plenary and
at the same time elusive. 17 The first documented legal use of
"nuisance" was in the twelfth century.1s The cause of action
"provid[ed] redress for interference with the use and enjoyment
of plaintiff's land resulting from acts committed on the defen-
dant's land."' 9 Many litigants chose to invoke nuisance law be-
cause of the availability of injunctive relief instead of simply
13. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th
ed. 1984).
14. Id. at 646.
15. See, e.g., City of Mankato v. Mahoney, 542 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996) (overturning a city council determination as arbitrary and ca-
pricious but alluding to a Minnesota statute allowing a sixty-day revocation of
the rental certificate). But see City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159, 161 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2000) (finding unconstitutional as applied to property owners a sta-
tute allowing a one-year shut-down period for problem properties).
16. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2004) (describing the flexibility of public nuisance actions that
makes them such a popular order control technique).
17. See Jeremiah Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L.
REV. 91, 109-12 (1921) (describing the frequent meaninglessness of the term
"nuisance").
18. Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 192-93 (1990).
19. Id. at 193.
[92:883886
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
monetary damages. 20 The divide between equitable and mone-
tary relief led to distinct and sometimes conflicting standards
with other actions, such as the requirement that the dispute
involve a freehold estate and that the wrong be by another
freeholder. 2 1 Courts later added to the confusion by creating a
right for plaintiffs to seek redress for interference with a public
right, traditionally a criminal action known as a public or
common nuisance.22 These conflicting standards led to a brand
of writ-shopping that ultimately resulted in a split between the
courts of law and equity.23
During the American Revolution, the operating rule in
nuisance cases was one of absolute protection for landowners. 24
However, the major economic shift from agriculture to manu-
facturing following the Civil War increased land-use conflicts
and caused corresponding shifts in nuisance law to favor eco-
nomic development. 25 Courts chipped away at private nuisance
actions by creating subsidiary doctrines such as statutory justi-
fication and the special injury requirement to protect industrial
actors. 26 Courts also increasingly hesitated to award injunctive
relief to landowners, especially where damages had not yet oc-
curred. 27 These entitlement approaches to resolving land use
conflicts-those that allocated rights absolutely to either land-
owners or industry-were ultimately unsuccessful, setting the
stage for modern nuisance law's utilitarian approach. 28
B. LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION AND REDEFINITION
By the mid-1800s, many state legislatures had codified
their public nuisance law and were expanding the law to fit the
20. Id. at 194.
21. Id. at 193-95.
22. Id. at 195.
23. See id. at 194 (describing the development of each kind of writ and cit-
ing litigants' freedom to choose between them).
24. Id. at 196-97. This acceptance likely stems from the fact that Black-
stone's Commentaries were "the primary source of legal authority in post-
colonial America," and Blackstone favored absolute protection for landowners.
Id. at 196.
25. Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance In-
junctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 670 (1976).
26. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 74-80 (1977); Kurtz, supra note 25, at 629-51; Lewin, supra
note 18, at 197.
27. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 630-38.
28. Lewin, supra note 18, at 200-12.
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changing social landscape. 29 This development changed the role
of courts in deciding public nuisance disputes and also pushed
the boundaries of what state legislatures could define as public
nuisances. Mugler v. Kansas30 was the first Supreme Court
case to address this trend of legislative expansion and set the
stage for future disputes over the legal limits of public nuisance
law.
1. Codification of the Common Law and the Role of Legislative
Discretion
In Mugler, the court examined Kansas's utilization of pub-
lic nuisance law to prevent both production and consumption of
alcohol as codified in its liquor abatement laws.3 1 The combined
case involved an appeal from a citizen convicted of manufactur-
ing beer without a license, as well as the state's appeal from the
dismissal of a declaratory nuisance action against the owner of
a brewery. 32 Opponents claimed Kansas's revision of public
nuisance law to forbid the production and consumption of alco-
hol violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Im-
munities and Due Process Clauses by altering the property
rights of the owners without legal process. 33 The building own-
ers further claimed that the loss in property value of their bre-
wery constituted a regulatory taking requiring compensation. 34
The Supreme Court found that the Kansas laws were con-
stitutional as long as the statutorily defined public nuisance
ordinances attempted to protect against injuries to the health,
morals, or safety of the community. 35 Further, the Court held
that states were not required to compensate landowners for ex-
ercises of their police power. 36 This broad holding enabled state
legislatures to redefine and apply nuisance law as a social con-
trol technique, foreshadowing the Progressive Era reforms.37
29. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 643-66 (describing the his-
torical evolution of public nuisance law).
30. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
31. Id. at 653.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 657.
34. Id. at 664 (arguing for compensation, but not explicitly addressing the
Fifth Amendment because of the undeveloped state of takings legal stan-
dards).
35. Id. at 668-69.
36. Id.
37. Peter C. Hennigan, Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light Districts,
and the Transformation of Public Nuisance Law in the Progressive Era, 16
888 [92:883
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2. The Progressive Era Experiment and Urban Reorganization
The Progressive Era represented an important shift in ur-
ban public nuisance law. In the early twentieth century, most
American cities contained red-light "vice districts" where pros-
titution, gambling, and other illegal activities thrived with lit-
tle police interference. 38 Growing concern over the moral and
social problems created by these activities spurred attempts to
shut down these "immoral" centers. 39 Faced with widespread
police complacency and little confidence in public actors to en-
force the laws, reformers fought for legislation to give citizens
the power to deal with social ills through public nuisance
laws.40
By 1919, forty-one states had enacted nuisance laws to
eradicate the red-light districts within their borders. 41 Modeled
after the earlier liquor abatement laws employed by Iowa and
Kansas, the so-called Red Light Abatement ordinances operat-
ed by giving private individuals standing to bring public nuis-
ance actions and by eliminating the common law requirement
of "special injury" for private actions on behalf of the public
where the government was not bringing a criminal action. 42
Despite broad public support for Progressive Era nuisance
reforms, opponents argued that making public nuisance a pri-
vate action eviscerated the distinction between public and pri-
vate law43 and threatened a loss of civil liberties and procedural
protections. Nevertheless, reformers convinced legislatures to
waive these barriers. By the early 1920s, nearly all of the red-
light districts were eliminated, a testament to the dispersive
power of public nuisance law. 44 Though the popular Red Light
Abatement laws were never legally challenged, the trend of leg-
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 123, 137-46 (2004).
38. Id. at 125-26.
39. THOMAS C. MACKEY, RED LIGHTS OUT: A LEGAL HISTORY OF PROSTI-
TUTION, DISORDERLY HOUSES, AND VICE DISTRICTS, 1870-1917, at 121-23
(1987); see also Hennigan, supra note , at 126 (arguing that the focus on eradi-
cating red-light districts was spurred primarily by a public reconception of the
prostitute from a "fallen woman" to a "white slave," a victim of circumstance
forced into a dangerous trade).
40. Hennigan, supra note, at 125-27, 147.
41. Id. at 126-27.
42. MACKEY, supra note, at 126-27.
43. Id.
44. Hennigan, supra note , at 127. However, prostitution and other illegal
activities continued in most cities, albeit in a more dispersed manner. Id. at
196. Some argue that the activities were shifted to more marginalized but
equally concentrated vice districts in African American neighborhoods. Id.
2008] 889
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islative expansion would eventually force courts to consider the
proper limits of nuisance law.
C. PENNSYLVANIA COAL AND THE JUDICIARY'S RETREAT FROM
ABSOLUTE DEFERENCE
As Mugler and its progeny make clear, states and localities
traditionally enjoy broad discretion in the exercise of their po-
lice power and property regulation.4 5 Autonomy without judi-
cial review, however, can be dangerous. States can and often do
use nuisance law to pursue injunctive remedies for "crimes"
that fall outside of traditional criminal actions. 46 The relatively
low stakes involved in individual property disputes encourage
this use. In fact, urban order-disturbance problems are the
most frequent source of public nuisance litigation. 47 In the
years following the Progressive Era, however, the Court re-
treated from its initial standard of absolute legislative defe-
rence48 and established important definitional and constitu-
tional limitations on the application of public nuisance law.
While the principles of judicial review are limited, they are
every bit as applicable today as when Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. pierced the veil of complete local autonomy.
1. The Definitional Limits of Nuisance Law
Due to the powerful injunctive measures associated with
nuisance actions, courts have good reason to be suspicious of
creative nuisance statutes. In the 1922 case Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,49 the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under a
state law that forbade "the mining of anthracite coal in such a
way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any
structure used as a human habitation."5 0 Looking to the com-
mon law, Justice Holmes reasoned that a source of damage to a
single private house is not a public nuisance, even if similar
damage is inflicted on others in different places. 5 1
45. 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
46. See Werdegar, supra note 7, at 411 (noting California's use of public
nuisance law to prevent suspected gang members from engaging in legal activ-
ities, such as congregating in public or carrying pagers and cell phones).
47. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 644.
48. Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 485 (7th Cir. 1982).
49. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50. Id. at 412-13.
51. Id. at 413-14.
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Justice Holmes placed the law outside of the common law
definition of public nuisance because the damage to a single
private home does not constitute a public nuisance. 52 He then
held that the law exceeded the valid exercise of police power
and overturned the appellate court's grant of an injunctive or-
der to prevent mining in a manner that causes subsidence of
land.53 Pennsylvania Coal thus provides guidance for modern
nuisance law: though states and localities enjoy a great deal of
latitude in their property control, courts must be suspicious of
redefinitions of nuisance law that stray from the traditional
common law definitions of public nuisance. 54 The special defe-
rence given to nuisance law only extends so far as the common
law definition of nuisance logically supports. Beyond that,
states proceed at their own peril, though admittedly appellate
courts seldom venture into this realm of uncertainty for fear of
encroaching on traditional state powers. 55
2. The Takings Clause: An Exception and Implicit Limitation
In many jurisdictions, only a public official may sue for a
public nuisance, absent a special injury.5 6 But the fact that a
law regulates property for the perceived common good does not
place it outside of the Fifth Amendment's protection against
takings without just compensation.57 Rather, courts interpret-
ing the Takings Clause 58 assume that the property regulation
is in the public interest and nevertheless subject the regulatory
action to scrutiny. 59 Thus, while the Takings Clause reserves
broad leeway for state regulation of property and exercise of po-
52. Id. at 415-16.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Garnett, supra note , at 23 ("As a matter of federal constitutional
law, it is well established that nonconfiscatory land-use regulations are sub-
ject to rational basis review-that is, they will be upheld if the court is satis-
fied that some conceivable government interest justifies the governmental pol-
icy.").
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979).
57. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 ("The protection of private proper-
ty in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but
provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation."(citing
U.S. CONST. amend. V)).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.").
59. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
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lice power, states must also take care to ensure that their nuis-
ance laws do not transgress the limits of takings law.
The Supreme Court's groundbreaking and oft-criticized de-
cision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council changed the
landscape of takings law by requiring compensation where
state regulations result in a loss of all economically beneficial
use for a property.60 Lucas, like Pennsylvania Coal, places ma-
jor import on "the extent of the diminution" of the property in
determining whether "the legislature has gone beyond its con-
stitutional power."6 1 While the decision upheld a broad excep-
tion for nuisance law and other exercises of state police power,
Lucas's holding nevertheless expands the legislature's respon-
sibility to compensate landowners in the nuisance context.62
Following Lucas, many courts reevaluated whether the use
of nuisance law in certain urban renewal injunctive efforts vi-
olated the Takings Clause.63 Several scholars expressed con-
cern that nuisance proceedings against property owners who
lack knowledge of their tenants' illegal actions might fall out-
side the Lucas Takings Clause exception for the state exercise
of police power, including regulation of public nuisances. 64
While these concerns resulted in some favorable decisions for
property owners, public nuisance law nevertheless continues to
be a primary urban order-control technique.
60. 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
61. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
62. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the
Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 28-29 (1993) (arguing that Lucas
impinges upon the legislature's sovereignty in nuisance and property regula-
tion under the guise of its Takings Clause power).
63. See, e.g., Becker v. State, 767 A.2d 816, 821-22 (Md. 2001) ("[A]n in-
junction abating nuisance 'should go no further than is absolutely necessary
.... .(citation omitted)); State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81, 81
(Ohio 1998) (holding the closure of property as part of nuisance abatement
procedure to constitute a compensable taking because the owner was inno-
cent); City of Cincinnati ex rel. Cosgrove v. Grogan, 753 N.E.2d 256, 256, 267
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (granting innocent owners constitutional protection from
uncompensated closure); City of Erie v. Stelmack, 780 A.2d 824, 827 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001) (establishing that the remedy to abate nuisance should be
shaped to correspond to the nature and extent of the nuisance to avoid being
purely punitive); City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159, 170 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (granting compensation because the innocent owner was denied the
beneficial use of the property for a full year).
64. See Carmon M. Harvey, Comment, Protecting the Innocent Property
Owner: Takings Law in the Nuisance Abatement Context, 75 TEMP. L. REV.
635, 637 (2002) (arguing that courts should utilize an ad hoc inquiry including
consideration of the innocence of a property owner in determining whether a
nuisance action constitutes a taking).
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3. The Modern Definitions of "Public Nuisance": A Tripartite
Conceptual Framework
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuis-
ance as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to
the general public."65 The damages in public nuisance actions
can be either monetary or injunctive and courts must weigh the
gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct. 66 Up un-
til this point, this Note has treated public nuisance law as a
unified body of law for the purposes of understanding the pa-
rameters of judicial scrutiny of this unique form of property
regulation. Apart from the similarities mentioned above, how-
ever, public nuisance actions can be divided into three distinct
types of actions: publicly brought criminal actions, publicly
brought civil actions, and privately brought civil actions. The
differences between the actions are significant and the re-
mainder of this Note focuses on the shortcomings of publicly
brought civil actions, and on possible reforms.
a. Publicly Brought Criminal Actions
As mentioned above, public nuisance law originated as a
criminal action.67 Most states have incorporated this common
law crime into their statutes and prosecute traditional beha-
vioral nuisances, 68 as well as other modern statutory interpre-
tations defining private invasions of a public right.69 Public
nuisance statutes that enumerate specific acts constituting the
offense usually invoke strict liability, whereas statutes incorpo-
rating the common law offense without specificity require neg-
ligence or some other heightened mens rea.70
b. Publicly Brought Civil Actions
Public nuisance actions initiated by local governments in
civil court are perhaps the most common application of modern
public nuisance law.71 In these actions, city or county actors
bring civil or administrative actions against property owners to




69. See, e.g., Hedges, supra note 6; Oakland, supra note 9 (cataloging
permutations of public nuisance statutes designed to reach subjects as strange
and varied as dog ownership and housing for sex offenders).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
71. See id. § 821C, cmt. j.
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seek injunctive relief, normally for either abatement of proper-
ty conditions or, less frequently, behavioral nuisances.7 2 Be-
cause of the differing standard of proof in civil court-
preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable
doubt-state and local actors wishing to avoid the strictures of
the criminal process find this remedy attractive. 73
c. Privately Brought Civil Actions
In order for a private actor to bring a public nuisance ac-
tion, courts apply the special injury rule, requiring that an in-
dividual suffer a harm "of a kind different from that suffered by
other members of the public exercising the right common to the
general public."74 The Restatement (Second) of Torts further
suggests that the person "have standing to sue as a representa-
tive of the general public, as a citizen in a citizen's action or as
a member of a class in a class action."75 This action differs from
the two above in that it involves private individuals as plain-
tiffs, rather than state actors, with implications in both the re-
sources for prosecution and the types of remedies available giv-
en the venue in civil courts.
The remainder of this Note focuses on the use of the second
type of public nuisance law-publicly brought nuisance actions
in civil courts. This is the predominant method in urban prop-
erty control, 76 and its differences from other forms of public
nuisance law present dangerous consequences for poor and mi-
nority tenants in modern cities.
D. URBAN RENEWAL: A NEW APPLICATION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
LAW
The use of nuisance statutes to evict tenants from rental
housing is a relatively new phenomenon in American cities.
Fueled by the popular "broken windows" view that disorder en-
72. Garnett, supra note 16, at 20-21.
73. Id. (noting the flexibility inherent in such remedies); see also Mary M.
Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinc-
tion, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1329 (1991) (noting the adverse effect on individ-
ual rights caused by civil prosecution of criminal acts).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979). Treatise writers
have named this limitation the "special injury rule." Hennigan, supra note 37,
at 131.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979).
76. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 643.
[92:883
PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW
courages further disorder and lawlessness, 77 many cities over
the last several decades have attempted to reclaim their neigh-
borhoods from drugs and disrepair by refusing to tolerate any
appearance of disorder.78 The broken windows movement began
with increased community patrols and emphasized maintaining
public order, such as by strictly enforcing vandalism and pan-
handling laws. 79 Initially perceived as a great success, many ci-
ties expanded their efforts to property control by using con-
demnation to shut down so-called problem properties.80 After
running into Takings Clause problems in the use of condemna-
tion, many cities turned to public nuisance law to address prob-
lems traditionally within the purview of criminal law.81
In addition to shoring up public enforcement, many states
modified their landlord-tenant law to give landlords and cities
more power to evict tenants they suspected of drug-related
crimes. Many state legislatures created a statutory right to
seek eviction of such tenants,8 2 though the more aggressive
statutes did not survive judicial scrutiny.8 3 The Supreme Court
recently affirmed the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's use of lease provisions that authorize no-fault evic-
77. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-31 (propos-
ing a public order model where decline and lack of public order spurs further
disorder in neighborhoods).
78. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 1-6 (describing the impact of the theory
on neighborhood order initiatives).
79. Id.; see, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 41 (1999) (affirm-
ing an innovative Chicago ordinance that allowed police to disperse crowds on
streets where the police believed that drugs might be involved).
80. Garnett, supra note 16. But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken
Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 291, 301-39, 377-86 (1998) (arguing that the community policing
model fails to deter crime); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness,
and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRI-
MINOLOGY 775, 775-89 (1999) (arguing that order-maintenance efforts are
based on faulty sociology and that legislatures should reconsider the racial
stereotypes they enforce).
81. Garnett, supra note 16, at 20-21.
82. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-15 (2006) (allowing eviction for spe-
cified serious nuisances, including drug use or sale); The Residential Drug-
Related Evictions Act of 1990, D.C. CODE § 42-3601 to -3610 (2001).
83. See Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2005) (affirming
the finding of a procedural due process violation in a city ordinance obliging
landlords to initiate eviction proceedings against all the occupants of a rental
unit if the chief of police suspected that a tenant was engaging in or allowing




tion for drug activity, adopting the rather broad reasoning that
the regulation is authorized by the government's power to ab-
ate nuisances.8 4 This decision is especially notable since the
Court refused to limit its holding to the context of government
landlords. The Court reasoned instead that "[s]uch no-fault
eviction is a common incident of tenant responsibility under
normal landlord-tenant law and practice."8 5 Such public nuis-
ance statutes-and the case law interpreting them-increase
the ability of landlords, neighbors, and public authorities to
more aggressively prosecute perceived disorder in urban neigh-
borhoods.
Under the problem property model currently operating in
most major cities, "a public nuisance case results from com-
plaints from the public about a nuisance condition, subject to
the attorney general's independent assessment whether a pub-
lic nuisance exists."8 6 Awareness of nuisance conditions arises
from either direct law enforcement observation or from com-
munity input and pressure about neighborhood problems.8 7 A
state or city attorney then determines whether it will file a
criminal action against the persons involved or whether it will
seek injunctive relief, such as eviction or temporary closure of
the property. Part II considers the consequences when public
actors prosecute these violations in civil court.
II. RECONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES: PUBLICLY
BROUGHT CIVIL PUBLIC NUISANCE ACTIONS AND
URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION
This Part deconstructs current urban public nuisance poli-
cy to demonstrate the clear need for widespread public and pri-
vate sector reforms. Part II begins by debunking the broken
windows assumption, addressing the methodological problems
concerning public actors in the civil arena, and highlighting the
84. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002).
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public
Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer,
54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 384 (1990).
87. See, e.g., Dep't of Safety and Inspections, How to Make a Housing
Complaint, http://www.stpaul.gov/depts/dsi/codeinsp/protocols.html (last vi-
sited Dec. 4, 2007) (explaining reporting methods for neighbors to strategize
with police to shut down properties); see also JEFFREY R. HENIG, NEIGHBOR-
HOOD MOBILIZATION: REDEVELOPMENT AND RESPONSE 40-72 (1982) (offering




Takings Clause problems inherent in the current public nuis-
ance system. This Part then discusses the economic inefficien-
cies of the current mode of enforcement and the sociological
problems inherent in this type of intervention. These weak-
nesses form a basis for the public and private reforms discussed
in Part III.
A. DEBUNKING THE BROKEN WINDOWS ASSUMPTION
The assumptions that underlie publicly brought civil ac-
tions are particularly vulnerable to attack. The rule that a pub-
lic nuisance must constitute something more than multiple pri-
vate nuisances was established long before Pennsylvania
Coal.8 8 Since private actors were first empowered to bring pub-
lic nuisance actions, courts have imposed the special injury rule
and other limiting doctrines to avoid giving the force (and supe-
rior injunctive remedies) of public matters to private disputes.89
Publicly brought civil actions, however, do not require plaintiffs
to demonstrate the public nature of the matter90 because of the
assumption that public actors act in the public interest. 91 How-
ever, judicial faith in public actors is not limitless.92
The rationale behind publicly brought civil public nuisance
actions is similar to broken windows theory. Like the broken
windows theory, publicly brought civil public nuisance actions
assume that the behavior of a few individuals can have such a
pervasive effect not only on neighbors, but on a group of people
so large that multiple private actions cannot effectively resolve
the dispute.93 It is because of this assumption that courts have
not imposed Pennsylvania Coal's rule on municipal actors who
88. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("A
source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar dam-
age is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not common or
public." (citing Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 95, 103
(1866))).
89. See HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 74-80; Kurtz, supra note 25, at 629-
51; Lewin, supra note 18, at 197; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C (1979).
90. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (setting
forth a simple definition for public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public"), with id. § 821C (adding the so-
called special injury requirement for individuals to maintain a public nuisance
action).
91. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
92. See id.
93. Garnett, supra note 16, at 1-6, 20.
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bring such suits. 94 This approach has gone practically unchal-
lenged in both courts and academia; 95 however, there is little
philosophical or empirical support for this assumption.
From a philosophical perspective, the central problem with
the broken windows theory is that it assumes there are two
classes of people-the disorderly and the orderly-and that
these categories are not fungible.96 Under the broken windows
theory, orderly people move out of a neighborhood at the first
appearance of disorder. 97 The disorderly then move in and the
neighborhood subsequently deteriorates.98 This supposition,
however, ignores the complexity and particularly flexible na-
ture of human behavior. 99 The theory also fails to account for
confounding variables such as increased police force sizes and
numerous sociological factors of the populations where order-
maintenance methods have been studied.100
Acknowledging the weaknesses of the broken windows
theory sheds new light on the public nuisance debate and chal-
lenges the assumption that the effects of private behavior are
indeed so pervasive as to make an individual's private actions
an inadequate remedy. Without the support of the broken win-
dows assumption, urban renewal proponents must prove that a
problem property or neighbor is a larger problem than a few
citizens could adequately address in a private nuisance ac-
tion. 101 With the problem thus defined, the support for publicly
brought private nuisance actions is far less persuasive than its
proponents suggest.
B. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM: PUBLIC ACTORS IN THE
CIVIL ARENA
The above discussion highlights the problems with the
broken windows assumption that underlies public nuisance in-
tervention. There is an equally troubling methodological prob-
lem, however, with publicly brought civil actions compared to
94. Id.
95. See Harcourt, supra note 80, at 293 (noting the lack of scholarly chal-
lenges to the broken windows assumption).




100. Id. at 308-39.
101. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922) (es-
tablishing that multiple private nuisances do not constitute a public nuisance).
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the criminal remedies available to public actors. The use of
criminal law in the civil context is a pervasive trend in modern
law,102 and publicly brought civil public nuisance actions are no
exception. Civil criminal remedies remove procedural and sub-
stantive protections that defendants enjoy under criminal law
while subjecting those civil defendants to severe injunctive
measures.
103
While no one questions the right of public actors to seek in-
junctive relief, the use of civil injunctive actions in lieu of statu-
tory criminal remedies for public nuisance violations presents
distinct problems. In many cases, statutes authorizing publicly
brought civil actions incorporate the criminal law directly but
do not address the different burdens of proof and procedural
protections of criminal statutes, creating ambiguity and uncer-
tainty.1 04 Civil remedies, if they act sufficiently similar to crim-
inal sanctions, are subject to the strictures of criminal law
guarantees. 105 The most common factors used to determine
whether a public actor is using a civil remedy for criminal or
civil purposes are legislative intent, severity of sanctions, stig-
ma, and intent to punish. 06 Application of each of these tests to
publicly brought civil public nuisance actions yields the same
conclusion: public actors under the current public nuisance re-
gime use the civil law for criminal law functions. Therefore, de-
fendants should be guaranteed the safeguards of criminal law.
The legislative goal driving public nuisance law is order or
property control. Thus, public nuisance laws likely lack the in-
tent to create a criminal remedy or to punish defendants. 0 7
Even conceding a lack of legislative intent to use the civil law
for criminal purposes, however, the loss of housing for both te-
nants and homeowners constitutes a severe penalty. In addi-
tion, the administrative or civil court proceedings utilized to de-
termine whether a public nuisance exists impose considerable
stigma on the property occupants and/or owners being prose-
cuted. Though eviction or other injunctive relief differ from a
finding of guilt for a criminal offense, the allocation of guilt in a
102. Cheh, supra note 73, at 1325-28.
103. Id. at 1325-30.
104. Id.; see, e.g., ST. PAUL, MINN., ADMIN. CODE § 91.01 (2007), available
at http://www.ci.stpaul.mn.us/code/ac091.html (referencing state public nuis-
ance statutes, but at the same time redefining some key terms while failing to
define others).
105. Cheh, supra note 73, at 1330-31.
106. Id.
107. Garnett, supra note 16, at 20.
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civil proceeding is every bit as stigmatizing for its assignment
of blame and creation of temporary homelessness.
Though some critics disapprove of the subjective nature of
balancing between factors,108 the severity of punishment and
stigma wrought by publicly brought civil actions overwhelming-
ly outweigh the weak evidence of legislative intent. Expansive
remedies come with a cost. Dissolving the distinction between
criminal and civil courts results in defendants' loss of civil li-
berties and procedural rights because of the increased power
and discretion given to government actors. 10 9 The further struc-
tural advantages enjoyed by repeat players such as govern-
ments1 10 in all aspects of litigation counsel against the dilution
of procedural guarantees of one-shot defendants.
C. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AND THE LIMITS OF STATE AND LOCAL
POLICE POWER
Theoretically, courts do not subject state and local police
power to the strictures of takings law-a valid exercise of police
power can never be a taking.1 1 1 However, this general rule is
not as clear in practice. Regulatory takings jurisprudence at-
tempts to draw the line between the exercise of police power
and state action that requires compensation. 1 2 Given the im-
portance of this distinction, evaluating the use of public nuis-
ance law by public actors requires consideration of both the
substance of takings jurisprudence and the boundaries of police
power.
1. Loss of Economic Benefit for Inner-City Owners and
Residents
Although most recent cases focus on the losses of inner-city
property owners in the public nuisance realm, both landowners
and tenants lose economic benefits when public actors pursue
injunctive relief for public nuisances. Property owners face
108. See Cheh, supra note 73, at 1330-31.
109. See Hennigan, supra note 37, at 146-48 (explaining the significance of
the Progressive Era debate over the scope of nuisance law and the conse-
quences on civil liberties).
110. Galanter, supra note 11, at 19-21.
111. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 (1992) (arguing
that under regulatory takings jurisprudence, the language "prevention of
harmful use' was merely [an] early formulation of the police power justifica-





Draconian penalties such as indefinite revocation of their ren-
tal license and mandatory shut-down periods due to drug activ-
ity on their properties. 113 While it is true that most landlords
know that they are subject to such regulations when they take
title to their property and acquire their rental registration, it is
equally clear that a landowner's loss of rental value qualifies as
a lost economic benefit under a plain reading of the Lucas
standard. 1 4 The next step in the Takings Clause analysis post-
Lucas is to determine whether the regulations are a valid exer-
cise of state police power.
The modern interpretation of lease agreements focuses on
their contractual nature rather than the property interests that
dominated common law jurisprudence. 115 Much of the discus-
sion of lost economic benefits post-Lucas, however, assumes
that the only party with a stake in challenges to nuisance stat-
utes is the landowner.11 6 This focus derives from the fact that
landlords are more likely parties to challenge nuisance deci-
sions, whereas one-shot players like poor urban tenants rarely
have the resources to litigate." 7 In addition, tenants have little
financial incentive to litigate given the relatively small finan-
cial value of their tenancy compared to the costs of the exten-
sive appeals necessary to enact rule change. 118 Acknowledging
the contractual interest of tenants in their property, however,
affirms that publicly brought civil nuisance prosecution consti-
tutes a loss of economic benefit for tenants like Monica and
Shawn under Lucas and thus deserves rigorous protection un-
der the Takings Clause." 9 The only remaining barrier to such
protection is the issue of whether tenants' losses fall under the
police power exception to the Takings Clause.
113. See, e.g., City of Mankato v. Mahoney, 542 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (upholding the revocation of a rental certificate and applying a de-
ferential rational basis test to city determinations of nuisance and other prop-
erty issues).
114. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
115. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 456-58 (5th ed.
2002).
116. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 64, at 637 (confining his Takings Clause
inquiry to the narrow subset of innocent property owners in the case of urban
public nuisance actions).
117. Galanter, supra note 11, at 14-18.
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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2. Take It to the Limit: The Boundaries of State Police Power
Lucas dealt with police regulation in the narrow situation
where a regulation was not part of the "bundle of rights" of
property ownership under state law at the time of acquisi-
tion.120 Courts must also determine, however, when police pow-
er transgresses into a regulatory taking requiring compensa-
tion regardless of when a state legislature approves a rule
depriving an individual of the economic benefit of their proper-
ty. Unfortunately, the law in this area is underdeveloped, par-
ticularly with regard to public nuisance statutes. But just as
the Pennsylvania Coal Court was willing to limit the scope of
nuisance law, modern courts should also consider whether a
given expansion of nuisance law exceeds the boundaries of
state police power in the realm of regulatory takings. Thus, the
circular Takings Clause discussion necessarily returns to the
definitional limits of public nuisance law discussed above.
D. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE INTEREST?: THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ARGUMENT
Given the limited judicial scrutiny devoted to public nuis-
ance claims,121 it is important to examine the policy ramifica-
tions of public nuisance law in action. The absence of judicial
scrutiny flows from a long-held belief that legislatures are in
the best position to "balance the advantages and disadvantag-
es" in a particular field of regulation. 122 Showing that legisla-
tures are not particularly adept at regulating a field bolsters
the argument for both judicial intervention and legislative
reform, especially if the law is economically ineffective. 123 Since
legislators are unsuccessfully managing public nuisance law, it
is important to evaluate whether public nuisance legislation
takes accurate account of considerations of economic efficiency.
In examining the economic efficiency of a particular law,
economists look first at whether a rule "maximizes the aggre-
gate dollar value of goods, services, and other sources of utili-
120. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07, 1027-32.
121. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 20, 23-24.
122. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
123. If legislatures intend to impose economic inefficiency, that is another
matter; they are certainly free to subsidize certain behavior or create ineffi-
ciencies if those actions are deemed necessary to the law's purpose. Imposing
economic inefficiency thoughtlessly, however, argues against the presumption
of deference to legislatures because it imputes irresponsibility to the part of
the body supposedly best-equipped to regulate in the field.
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ty."124 Legal rules may affect utility by establishing incentives
to avoid conflict. 125 These rules may also alter the costs and
profitability of activities by forcing actors to internalize the ex-
ternal costs of their behavior. 126 It is clear that legislatures
have not adequately considered these economic principles in
the field of public nuisance law.
Publicly brought civil public nuisance actions allow private
actors to utilize the nuisance process to push their private
agendas when they would not personally pursue litigation.
Public actors likewise hedge their bets by not investing in the
traditional criminal process. In each of these cases, the entitled
parties do not internalize the costs of their behavior, creating
external costs for others. Private citizens do not take into ac-
count whether a private lawsuit would be more efficient given
the availability of "community input," which encourages private
citizens to contact a designated agency and rally together to
declare neighbors' property a public nuisance. 127 Likewise, pub-
lic actors do not have to consider the merits of their case as se-
riously as they would if they chose to bring a criminal action
due to the procedural differences of the venues. In addition to
these externalities, public nuisance regulation also discourages
urban property investment by pricing out investors due to the
uncertainty of intervention, 128 imposing further costs on af-
fected neighborhoods. While governments may articulate valid
policy reasons for choosing to allow these economic inefficien-
cies, other detrimental policy implications-as discussed be-
low-further counsel against publicly brought civil public nuis-
ance actions.
E. NEIGHBORHOOD COMPOSITION, RACE ASSUMPTIONS, AND
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
INTERVENTION
The success of the Red Light Abatement movement in the
Progressive Era demonstrates the power of public nuisance law
to change neighborhood composition. 129 The success of beha-
vioral public nuisance efforts, however, depends on whether
they merely disperse classes of people or whether the laws ac-
124. Lewin, supra note 18, at 236.
125. Id. at 236-37.
126. Id. at 237.
127. See, e.g., Dep't of Safety and Inspections, supra note 87.
128. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 26, 50-52.
129. Hennigan, supra note 37, at 126-27.
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tually decrease or deter the regulated behavior. 130 If injunctive
prosecution only disperses "problem" individuals rather than
deterring them from repeating the behavior, then public nuis-
ance prosecution merely relocates problem tenants, forcing new
communities to deal with the same public order problems.
Resolving this dilemma requires empirical research,
though the data is less than conclusive due to the difficulty in
tracking individuals who are evicted or otherwise moved by
threatened or actual prosecution under public nuisance law.
Nevertheless, sociological literature generally answers that
such intervention causes dispersion rather than deterrence,
though the degree of dispersion varies based on the particular
circumstances. 13 1 The result of the dispersive nature of public
nuisance regulation is not only economic inefficiency, but also
unjust social burdens for both the neighborhoods where public
nuisance regulation is strongest and the neighborhoods where
"problem" individuals relocate.
Understanding whether public nuisance law is effective in
operation also requires examination of how public nuisance law
is driven by mistaken racial assumptions. According to many
critics of the broken windows theory, order-maintenance efforts
consistently fail to consider the racial stereotypes they en-
force. 132 In these critics' view, "order-maintenance policing...
ignore[s] the disturbing potential for these practices to enforce
and magnify racist norms of presumed Black criminality."'133
This presumption of "Black criminality" can lead to increased
policing of minority groups, especially given the amount of stat-
utory ambiguity and prosecutorial discretion given to law en-
forcement personnel.134
Further complicating the discussion of race are the dispa-
rate effects public order prosecution imposes on racial minori-
ties. No reasonable person denies that so-called urban renewal
efforts have extremely racially disparate effects on minority
groups. 35 Proponents of order-control efforts claim that this
130. See id. at 154, 193-96.
131. Id. at 127 (discussing dispersion in the closing of red-light districts
due to public nuisance prosecution).
132. Roberts, supra note 80, at 779-80, 799-801; see also Garnett, supra
note 16, at 52-53 (discussing the resulting "us versus them" mentality caused
by racial disparities).
133. Roberts, supra note 80, at 779-80.
134. Id. at 780-89 (discussing the consequences of statutory vagueness on
prosecution of minority groups).
135. See id. at 779; see also Harcourt, supra note 80, at 299 (observing the
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disparate impact on minorities does not indicate a discrimina-
tory purpose; instead, it results from the legitimate prosecution
of wrongdoers, and concentrated poverty and social effects are
often associated with racial groups.136 Others argue-somewhat
more insidiously-that disparities should not matter; the pros-
ecution of criminals need not be racially balanced if the offend-
ers are concentrated in racial groups. 137 But racial animus can
be inferred by the fact that community racism often fuels public
nuisance prosecution, especially where cities utilize community
input systems. 138 The fact that racism underlies a system that
operates on a lower burden of proof, informal administrative
hearings, and potentially severe penalties strongly suggests
that lawmakers should reform current practices. 139
F. SAFEGUARDING RIGHTS OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS
Publicly brought civil nuisance actions present the problem
of evading the procedural strictures of the criminal law and
putting the force of the state behind private disputes that are
often motivated by racial biases. 140 Ideally, this approach aims
to protect the urban poor who are legitimately concerned with
their neighborhoods but lack the resources to initiate public
nuisance actions. This method actually hurts poor individuals
accused of public nuisance violations, however, because of the
decreased procedural protections 4' and the fact that they must
litigate against the enormous resources of public actors who are
repeat players. 42 It is difficult to resolve which interest is the
strongest between poor defendants and poor inner-city resi-
dents, since both are particularly vulnerable and thus will be
strongly affected by the allocation of legal entitlements. But
constant public nuisance intervention in cities prices out urban
investment; 143 given the instability of property investment in
volatile neighborhoods, regulation should be a last resort.
disparity between high arrest rates of minorities and their relative proportion
in urban populations).
136. See Roberts, supra note 80, at 819-22 (discussing the theme of "Law
Enforcement as Black Liberation" among criminal justice and race scholars).
137. See id. at 820-21.
138. Garnett, supra note 16, at 50-53; see also HENIG, supra note 87, at
40-72.
139. Garnett, supra note 16, at 53.
140. Cheh, supra note 73, at 1325-26, 1329-30.
141. See id.
142. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 19-20.
143. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 50-51.
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Even in the absence of conclusive empirical evidence about
dispersion, residents in gentrifying urban neighborhoods great-
ly fear displacement and thus view any public intervention as a
socioeconomic tool designed to exact their removal from valua-
ble real estate.14" This opposition is rooted in a sense of shared
community and resistance to the influence of outsiders in
changing the community without their input.145 Though per-
ception is not necessarily the same thing as reality, public
nuisance regulation can lead to gentrification when the disper-
sal of problem individuals forces community change by clearing
away the barriers that stand in the way of investment. Without
protective measures in place, the changes in communities that
accompany gentrification ultimately price out the poor who
have weathered the community through difficult times.146 This
perverse reversal of the broken windows hypothesis creates a
situation where the "orderly" poor are unable to live in their
communities once the disorderly individuals are displaced.
When viewed alongside the legal, economic, and social cri-
tiques above, the pricing-out and gentrifying effects of public
nuisance regulation tip the scale against the current use of
publicly brought civil public nuisance actions. Part III con-
structs a policy system consisting of short-term statutory
reform and a long-term public-private partnership that pre-
serves the democratic value of local control over property while
remedying the current deficiencies of public nuisance prosecu-
tion.
III. TOWARD A NEW URBAN PUBLIC ORDER REGIME:
POLICY SOLUTIONS
Given the reality of the broad discretion in state and local
property regulation, the decision about how best to reform ur-
ban order-control efforts is-at least on a practical level-an is-
sue for legislatures, not courts. 147 The serious legal, social, and
economic problems with the current urban order regime, how-
144. See LANCE FREEMAN, THERE GOES THE 'HOOD: VIEWS OF GENTRIFICA-
TION FROM THE GROUND UP 162-64 (2006).
145. See id. at 163 (describing how fear of displacement connotes loss of
community).
146. See id.; see also Biliana Cicin-Sain, The Costs and Benefits of Neigh-
borhood Revitalization, in URBAN REVITALIZATION 49, 56 (Donald B. Rosen-
thal ed., 1980).
147. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text (discussing the broad




ever, indicate that states and municipalities should look for
more creative ways to maintain public order in modern cities.
These proposed reforms would be accomplished at the state
level, given the lack of a federal interest in local property regu-
lation. Though this reality renders uniform reform impossible
unless the American Law Institute or other national legal asso-
ciations are able to press states to enact a similar package of
public nuisance reforms, the benefits to states that recognize
the problems in their current public nuisance statutes encou-
rages at least gradual reform.
The discussion below begins with necessary but short-term
reforms to public nuisance law. These reforms include the sus-
pension of publicly brought civil public nuisance actions, tem-
porary deregulation of privately brought public nuisance ac-
tions, and the incorporation of uniform procedural and legal
protections for civil and criminal courts. Reforming urban pub-
lic nuisance law, however, requires both public and private
participation to effectively maintain public order in modern ci-
ties. This Part concludes with a novel proposal for a public-
private enforcement structure along the lines of Title V11148
that reintroduces economic and market mechanisms to better
safeguard the rights of both the accused and the accuser in civil
public nuisance actions.
A. NECESSARY SHORT-TERM PUBLIC REFORMS TO PUBLIC
NUISANCE LAW
States and cities have innumerable policy options to com-
bat public order problems. This Section begins with legislative
and executive reforms to public nuisance law that are the ea-
siest to implement, both in terms of political feasibility and
simplicity. The necessary short-term reforms include suspend-
ing public civil actions, temporarily deregulating privately
brought public nuisance actions, and incorporating uniform
procedural and legal protections in both civil and criminal
courts. These solutions swiftly recognize and remedy the ur-
gency of the problems caused by the current public nuisance
regime. These are not long-term solutions, however, a fact evi-
denced not only by their individual shortcomings, but also from
the possibility of superior results when the private sector gets
involved in the enforcement process.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
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1. The First Step: Suspend Publicly Brought Civil Public
Nuisance Actions
The first and most obvious policy option for localities is
simple. Public nuisance definitions should be revised to prohi-
bit publicly brought civil public nuisance actions. This could
take place through one of two methods. First, states and muni-
cipalities could directly revise public nuisance statutes to ex-
clude publicly brought civil public nuisance actions. Alterna-
tively, states and municipal governments could issue executive
orders to local law enforcement and city and state attorneys to
cease civil prosecution of public nuisance actions by public ac-
tors. Under such policies, public actors would be required to
bring criminal actions or leave the civil prosecution to private
citizens. This scheme requires changing statutes but does not
require the creation of new laws, thus presenting a logical
starting point for reform.
The primary advantage of this policy is that it forces public
actors to build a strong case before going forward with prosecu-
tion. Public actors must take into account the procedural pro-
tections for defendants built into the criminal system. In addi-
tion, criminal prosecution requires strict attention to the
statutory definition of the public nuisance offense. Minnesota,
for example, requires two or more specified incidents of beha-
vior, clear and convincing evidence, and a thirty-day written
notice summarizing the nuisance and allowing an opportunity
to abate the nuisance before an action is filed.' 49 These re-
quirements protect defendants and prevent the state from act-
ing recklessly. Though bringing a criminal case is time-
consuming because of the numerous protections built into the
system for defendants and the large caseloads of the judges and
lawyers in the criminal system, these requirements protect de-
fendants and prevent the state from acting recklessly. Revised
statutes or executive orders should use the Minnesota statute
as a model by clearly specifying similar factors to facilitate
faster prosecution.
Suspension of publicly brought civil actions also has the
advantage of encouraging economic efficiency. In this scenario,
citizens must bear the costs of litigation and thus are less likely
to press forward unless they desire the result enough to bear
the consequences. This strength, however, may also advantage
the wealthy to the detriment of the poor who either cannot af-
149. MINN. STAT. § 617.81 (2004).
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ford to combat nuisances in their own jurisdiction or to defend
themselves if wrongfully accused. After all, it is often poor
communities that are forced to bear the costs created by an in-
flux of "problem" tenants displaced by order-control efforts in
other neighborhoods. 150 Thus, while this suggested first step is
perhaps the most straightforward policy to implement because
it does not require legislative innovation, it will likely lead to
underenforcement of public nuisance statutes. However, these
long-term economic disadvantages are far outweighed by the
necessity of short-term change to protect defendants until a
private attorney general enforcement scheme is in place to
more fully safeguard the interests of poor plaintiffs and defen-
dants.
2. The Private Deregulation Approach: The Progressive Era
(Temporarily) Revisited
If the primary deficiency of the current public nuisance ap-
proach is its lack of private involvement, legislatures should
consider ways to facilitate privately brought public nuisance
actions. The simplest way to accomplish this objective would be
to revise public nuisance statutes to remove the statutory and
common law barriers that make private actions difficult. In the
Progressive Era, legislatures accomplished these objectives by
eliminating the special injury rule and other requirements of
privately brought public nuisance actions to facilitate enforce-
ment of public rights. 151 By removing these barriers, private
citizens would be better able to pursue cases the government
cannot.
As the Progressive Era demonstrates, however, such dere-
gulation may also create negative consequences resulting from
the increased availability of the remedy. Overzealous tenants
with better financial or organizational resources may bully less
advantaged citizens. 152 Such an approach would create serious
problems due to its majority rule methods and lack of public ac-
countability. Removal of barriers without incorporating proce-
dural protections allows organized and economically advan-
taged groups to repeat the same problems caused by
overzealous public enforcement in civil court. Deregulation also
150. See, e.g., Hennigan, supra note 37, at 196.
151. MACKEY, supra note 39, at 126-27.
152. Hennigan, supra note 37, at 125, 127.
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leads to further blurring of the public/private distinction, a
condition which threatens civil liberties if left unconstrained. 153
Given these weaknesses, a pure deregulation policy poses
the same overuse weaknesses of Progressive Era reforms and
falls short of protecting vulnerable urban tenants and owners.
If included in an overall reform package, however, including
suspension of public actions in civil court and the procedural
remedies discussed below, deregulation is much more palatable
as a short-term reform to public nuisance law. Deregulation al-
lows private citizens to fill the temporary enforcement gap, but
the proposed private attorney general enforcement scheme will
ensure that future private involvement accurately takes into
account economic consequences.
3. The Direct Remedy: Incorporating Uniform Procedural and
Legal Protections for Public Nuisance Prosecution in Criminal
and Civil Court
Short-term reforms to public nuisance prosecution should
also address the weaknesses discussed in Part II while still al-
lowing public actors to pursue civil remedies. The "direct reme-
dy" reform would require states and municipalities to revise
and harmonize their statutes, clarifying what is currently a
mystifying area of law154 by incorporating procedural and legal
protections. The Minnesota criminal public nuisance statute
discussed above could serve as a model because it avoids indi-
scriminate prosecution by requiring multiple offenses of a clear-
ly defined set of circumstances constituting nuisance beha-
vior.155 Uniform revisions by states and their local subdivisions
to public nuisance law and enforcement would eliminate the
problems of inadequate legal protections for defendants without
confining public actors to bringing only criminal actions or
sponsoring inefficient private enforcement.
In addition to eliminating the problems caused by legal un-
certainty, legislatures should strongly consider increasing pro-
cedural protections for defendants, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or prosecutor is a public or private entity. A logical
starting point would be designating housing courts as the prop-
er venue for public nuisance disputes. Housing courts are
available in most urban areas and are designed to speed up the
judicial process while safeguarding rights and ensuring fair
153. See id. at 146-47.
154. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 646.
155. MINN. STAT. § 617.81 (2004).
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proceedings. 156 These courts allow for faster resolution than
criminal courts and are better equipped to understand the par-
ticular legal issues than administrative bodies or district
courts. 157 These protections force public actors to make sure
that they have a strong case before they attempt to evict ten-
ants.15 8 Finally, local public nuisance ordinances would also
benefit from a higher burden of proof, since they often incorpo-
rate state criminal law without clear reference to what burden
of proof applies in the civil context.1 59
Without these safeguards, nuisance law will continue to
serve as an easy way for law enforcement officers to circumvent
landlord-tenant law and constitutional requirements by impos-
ing severe injunctive penalties that mimic criminal sanctions
without allowing for the same procedural rights. But even with
the incorporation of procedural reforms, there is still an en-
forcement gap created by the cost of private litigation when
public actors do not have enough information or resources to
prosecute problem tenants. The discussion below suggests that
introduction of market mechanisms by a private attorney gen-
eral scheme presents the best long-term reform of privately
brought civil public nuisance actions, because it promises to
close the enforcement gap and encourage economic efficiency.
B. THE CARROT AND THE STICK: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
The prior discussion of private deregulation illustrates the
problems that would result if public nuisance prosecution is
completely turned over to private entities. Pure deregulation
may advantage the wealthy at the expense of poor defendants
and communities and allow for abuse of procedural advantages
by plaintiffs. Likewise, the suspension of publicly brought civil
public nuisance actions would likely lead to underenforcement
given the strictures of the criminal law and the limited public
resources available for prosecution. The uniform procedural
and legal reforms suggested in Part III.A.3 would help reduce
these problems, but the lack of economic incentives may still
156. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 115, at 507-08 (discussing use
of summary proceedings in housing disputes).
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Cheh, supra note 73, at 1325-29 (discussing the typical state and
local practice of utilizing civil remedies for criminal purposes).
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lead to inefficient behavior by private plaintiffs and public ac-
tors alike.
The most logical solution to this remaining dilemma is to
use financial incentives for private actors to bring private pub-
lic nuisance suits while maintaining the common law and stat-
utory barriers that prevent abuse. States and municipal gov-
ernments should create statutes that appropriate private
attorney general regimes such as Title VI 160 and qui tam16 1
provisions (defined below) to allow successful plaintiffs to seek
damages from tenants and landlords for the consequences of
public nuisance violations. A modified private attorney general
enforcement scheme reintroduces market mechanisms to the
decision whether to prosecute, giving financial incentives to
plaintiffs to pursue valid claims while allowing public actors to
prosecute where the facts merit public intervention.
1. The Private Attorney General: Federal Models
The federal government resolves the tension between sub-
sidization of meritless cases and the need for private help in
filling enforcement gaps by utilizing qui tam and other private
attorney general statutory innovations. A qui tam lawsuit is
"[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private per-
son to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some
specified public institution will receive." 162 Examples of such
provisions include the False Claims Act 163 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.164 These federal models provide help-
ful guidance for what such a public-private partnership might
look like under public nuisance law.
The False Claims Act allows persons with knowledge to
sue on behalf of the government in cases involving fraud
against the federal government. 165 If the government declines
to take the case, the individual plaintiff may go forward as a
"relator"; if successful, the plaintiff will be able to collect fifteen
to thirty percent of the total recovery.166 Title VII takes a simi-
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
161. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
163. 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
165. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
166. Id. § 3730(c)(3), (d); see also Carl Pacini & Michael Bret Hood, The
Role of Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deter-
ring Fraud Against Government, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 276 (2007).
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lar approach for claims of employment discrimination against
both public and private employers. The statute first requires
submission of claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).167 After the EEOC evaluates the merits of
the case and decides whether or not to intervene, the EEOC is-
sues a right to sue letter to the individual plaintiffs. 168
Such public-private partnerships facilitate increased en-
forcement by reallocating economic incentives and placing the
power of prosecution in the hands of interested parties, not
overworked government. Urban neighborhoods would benefit
from a private attorney general scheme that would reform an
area currently dominated by bureaucracy, entitlement ap-
proaches, and underenforcement. The discussion below ex-
amines the necessary components to translate a private attor-
ney general enforcement structure to the public nuisance
context.
2. Appropriating Private Attorney General Enforcement to
Civil Public Nuisance Law
A successful private attorney general program must offer
incentives to individual plaintiffs while avoiding the problem of
subsidizing cases without merit. There are at least four ele-
ments required to tread this fine line: financial incentives for
plaintiffs; an executive body to review complaints and inter-
vene; financial incentives and protections for defendants; and
continued procedural and legal protections for defendants.
a. Financial Incentives for Plaintiffs
The success of private nuisance actions under the current
public nuisance regime is hampered by the relatively low mone-
tary value of injunctive property actions in cases where local
actors decline, to pursue criminal actions. 169 To effectively en-
courage private enforcement, states and localities would have
to create an economic incentive for private plaintiffs who suc-
cessfully prosecute public nuisance violations. Placing a mone-
tary value on the virtue of a nuisance-free neighborhood is dif-
ficult, but hardly impossible; courts routinely make these
determinations. Under the False Claims Act, private plaintiffs
are able to recover reasonable expenses, attorney's fees, and
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
168. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
169. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 14-18.
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costs for pursuing the action. 170 Public nuisance plaintiffs could
recover similar compensatory damages for losses in property
values, cleanup or maintenance costs, or pain and suffering, in
addition to specified fines such as those available under the
False Claims Act. A private enforcement statute should also
create possible recovery in the form of punitive damages for es-
pecially egregious cases, such as when repeated gang violence
or drug sales from a house terrorize a neighborhood.
Financial incentives mean little, however, if defendants are
unable to pay for their damages. Thus, private enforcement
statutes should clearly provide mechanisms to recover from
both tenants and landlords by attaching a debt to the property
if a landlord or property owner fails to comply with the man-
dates of nuisance law. If nothing else, private enforcement stat-
utes should provide mechanisms for recovery of attorneys' fees
from the defendants or from a common fund in the event that
the defendants are unable to pay. 171 As has been the case in the
employment discrimination context, however, law firms will be
able to spread some of this risk of recovery by taking cases on a
contingent fee basis given their merits.
b. An Executive Body to Review Complaints and Intervene
Private enforcement of public nuisance violations depends
heavily on financial incentives. However, it is not difficult to
imagine scenarios where the financial recovery is minimal but
there is a great public interest in the litigation. For those situa-
tions-as well as to monitor public nuisance cases in general-
states should use the EEOC as a model for a centralized state
executive body to review complaints, investigate charges, and
intervene when the public interest demands. The reviewing
body's limited resources will force them-like the EEOC and
other similar organizations172-to carefully consider the organ-
ization's priorities and whether private resources could ade-
quately solve the problem.
Though .the body's caseload may be constrained by time
and resources, this limit may actually help public nuisance ac-
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
171. This could take the form of either state budget grants or payment
from the local bar association, which is sometimes available for clients who are
defrauded by attorneys.
172. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NATIONAL EN-
FORCEMENT PLAN, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/nep.html (last visited
Dec. 4, 2007) (noting the EEOC's limited resources).
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tions by preventing public actors from acting without regard to
the economic consequences of their actions. This new method of
public intervention in publicly brought civil public nuisance ac-
tions ensures that frivolous and uninformed actions like the
city prosecution of Monica and Shawn will not continue.
c. Financial Incentives (and Protections) for Defendants
One marked difference from the qui tam and employment
discrimination prosecution regimes discussed above and public
nuisance actions are the nature of the defendants. Unlike the
employers and corporations regulated by the False Claims
Act 173 or Title VII,174 the defendants in public nuisance actions
are largely individuals, with the exception of corporate lan-
dlords. Given this difference, a pure subsidy approach puts low-
income defendants at risk due to their inability to pay for their
defense. States and municipalities could counteract this weak-
ness by entitling defendants to attorneys' fees in the event of
their success. In addition, state and local governments could
designate legal aid or public defender funds to protect individ-
ual defendants who cannot afford to defend themselves. 175 In
addition, states should consider entitling defendants to damag-
es when prosecution is in bad faith. Without these protections,
privatization will simply repeat the dispersion problems of the
Progressive Era and give poor urban residents like Monica and
Shawn little choice but to leave at the first sign of threatened
litigation.
d. Continued Procedural and Legal Protections for Defendants
The differences between Title VII, qui tam, and public
nuisance defendants also highlight the need for procedural pro-
tections for defendants. As mentioned in Part III.A.3, these
protections should mirror and perhaps expand criminal protec-
tions using the Minnesota criminal statute as a model. 176 While
a private attorney general approach offers the potential of
striking the balance between under- and overenforcement, pri-
173. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
174. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
175. As the opening pages of this Note make clear, legal aid offices some-
times accept cases involving civil public nuisance actions. Without an infusion
of resources from state and local government to cover increased caseloads
caused by a private attorney general approach, however, these programs
would be unable to provide adequate defense to those in need.
176. MINN. STAT. § 617.81 (2004).
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vatization schemes may negatively impact civil liberties by
blurring the public/private distinction as in the Progressive
Era.177 Privatized enforcement schemes also favor repeat play-
ers and could lead to exploitation of the remedy for monetary
gain, as in the recent equity skimming trend in urban neigh-
borhoods. 178 Procedural and financial protections for defen-
dants, however, counteract these weaknesses by preventing ex-
ploitation and overzealous prosecution because of the economic
consequences of such actions and inability to succeed in weak
cases.
Without private involvement in the public nuisance
process, public order problems in poor urban neighborhoods
may be underenforced to the detriment of those communities.
However, successful private attorney general enforcement must
take care to incorporate these four elements into their new en-
forcement structure or urban residents will pay the price.
CONCLUSION
Once the deficient assumptions of broken windows theory
and faulty methodology of public order intervention are ac-
knowledged, it is clear that takings law and policy considera-
tions weigh against the current use of publicly brought civil
public nuisance actions as an urban renewal strategy. In light
of the serious weaknesses of the current public nuisance re-
gime, legislatures must actively search for creative policies that
satisfy constitutional limits, reflect better economic efficiency,
and revitalize urban neighborhoods, all while still protecting
their vulnerable citizens. By implementing the statutory re-
forms discussed above and an accompanying private attorney
general scheme, legislatures may accomplish these goals by re-
ducing the abuse of the remedy by public actors. The proposed
private attorney general reform allows private actors-who are
better able to account for the economic consequences of their
actions-to fill the enforcement gap that exists under current
public nuisance law and that will continue to exist even if
177. See Hennigan, supra note 37, at 146-47 (explaining the significance of
the Progressive Era debate over the scope of nuisance law and the conse-
quences on civil liberties).
178. Natasha Lim, Loan Fraud Becomes More Creative as Market Slows,
MORTGAGE SERVICING NEWS, June 1, 2007, at 8 (describing the trend of pre-
datory mortgage companies offering to help urban homeowners keep their
homes if they are behind on their payments, but in the process obtaining own-
ership of the home and taking equity out of the home while charging the for-
mer owners exorbitant monthly payments to regain ownership).
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short-term reforms are implemented. By acknowledging and
remedying the systemic biases that currently characterize the
realm of public nuisance law, 179 the proposed statutory reforms
recalibrate the legal landscape of public nuisance prosecution
to reflect societal values of both fairness and efficiency. Such
systemic reform is necessary to protect vulnerable low-income
residents like Monica and Shawn and ensure their inclusion in
healthy, diverse urban neighborhoods.
179. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 14-18.
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